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COMMENTARY
OBSCURING THE STRUGGLE: SEX DISCRIMINATION,
SOCIAL SECURITY, AND STONE, SEIDMAN,
SUNSTEIN & TUSHNET'S
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
Mary E. Becker*
At any given time, the more powerful [of the sexes] will
create an ideology suitable to help maintain its position and to
make this position acceptable to the weaker one.... It is the
function of such an ideology to deny or conceal the existence
of a struggle. Here is one of the answers to the question.., as
to why we have so little awareness of the fact that there is a
struggle between the sexes. It is in the interest of men to ob-
scure this fact; and the emphasis they place on their ideologies
has caused women, also, to adopt these theories.
Karen Homey.'
Both sexes have powerful reasons for obscuring the struggle be-
tween them. As Homey points out in the above passage, it is in men's
self interest to protect the status quo by obscuring the divergent inter-
ests of the two sexes. In the same essay, Homey also observes that
both sexes have reason to ignore the struggle: "we see love between
the sexes more distinctly than we see hate - because the union of the
sexes offers us the greatest possibilities for happiness. ' 2 Given this ex-
pectation, we "are naturally inclined to overlook ... the destructive
forces that continually work to destroy our chances for happiness."'3
Women have a number of other reasons for obscuring the struggle
besides the hope that they will find happiness in relationships with indi-
vidual men. Many women are (or want to be) economically dependent
on individual men because men tend to have greater economic re-
sources and potential than women. For these women, the best strategy
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago School of Law. I thank Doug Baird,
Walter Blum, Mary Ann Glendon, Kit Kinports, Deborah Rhode, Mike Seidman, Geof
Stone, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Morrison Torrey, and Diane Wood for helpful
comments on an earlier draft and Paul Bryan, Steve Duffy, Gregory Ivy, Jeannie
Polydoris, William Schwesig, and Charles Ten Brink for research assistance. Research
support was provided by the Kirkland and Ellis Faculty Research Fund.
References to G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, Constitutional Law
(1986), appear as Casebook.
1. Homey, The Distrust Between the Sexes, in Feminine Psychology 105, 116
(1967). I learned of Karen Homey's discussion from A. Rich, Of Woman Born 111
(10th Anniversary ed. 1986).
2. Homey, supra note 1, at 117.
3. Id. at 117-18.
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is often to act as though women's and men's interests were the same.4
Even women who reject economic or emotional dependence on indi-
vidual men have reasons to obscure the struggle: minimizing the con-
flict helps them maintain their sanity and their ability to operate
effectively within the current system. 5
One important way in which we obscure struggle between the
sexes is by obscuring one reason for struggle: inequality between the
sexes.6 If the sexes are already equal, then there is no need to struggle
over the (currently skewed) distribution of financial and physical secur-
ity, power, status, leisure time, and sexual satisfaction.
In law, inequality is obscured by accepting as discrimination only
that which the law prohibits rather than critically examining the law to
judge how well it deals with actual discrimination in the real world. If
discrimination is that which the law proscribes, then unremedied dis-
crimination must be pasty It follows that women and men are now
equal. There is no reason to struggle or need for change.
In this Commentary, I illustrate these points by analyzing the pres-
entation of sex discrimination challenges to the old-age portion of the
social security system in a recent and popular constitutional law
casebook: Stone, Seidman, Sunstein and Tushnet's, Constitutional Law
("casebook"). The authors use old-age social security cases-cases in
which there is a sex discrimination challenge to the social security sys-
4. See, e.g., A. Dworkin, Right-Wing Women 56-57, 65-67 (1978).
5. Women have, however, more to gain by changing the status quo than men have.
Women are, therefore, somewhat more likely to try to change the status quo by calling
attention to the struggle than are men.
6. For a discussion of other ways in which we obscure the struggle, see Becker,
Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. (forthcoming); cf.
Bourque & Grossholtz, Politics an Unnatural Practice: Political Science Looks at Female
Participation, 4 Pol. & Soc'y 225 (1974) (discussing sexist biases in political science that
tend to obscure political struggle between the sexes); Fraser, What's Critical About
Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender, 35 New German Critique 97
(1985) (analyzing ways in which Habermas obscured, rather than clarified, the struggle
between the sexes); Sapiro, Research Frontier Essay: When Are Interests Interesting?
The Problem of Political Representation of Women, 75 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 701 (1981)
(discussing difficulties women face in asserting their political interests).
7. For an example of such thinking, see Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317
(1977) (upholding social security provision allowing women reaching age 62 prior to
1972 to exclude more low-income years than men in benefit calculation). The Court
justified preferential treatment of women on the ground that women have been discrimi-
nated against in the past in the wage-labor market, implying that discrimination in the
wage-labor market is a thing of the past. But see Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the
Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel &
Lazear, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 934, 935-40 (1986) (noting that substantial barriers continue
to face women and that antidiscrimination legislation has been ineffective in eliminating
all barriers in the workplace). Moreover, the social security system itself is structured so
as to give men (who tend to be breadwinners) better old-age financial security than wo-
men. See infra sections II and III. Yet in Califano v. Webster, this continuing discrimina-
tion is ignored by the Court in deciding "preferential" treatment of women by the social
security system is permissible.
19891 265
HeinOnline  -- 89 Colum. L. Rev.  265 1989
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
tem's benefits for the elderly-for a substantial portion of their presen-
tation of the constitutional law of sex discrimination. One of the three
major edited cases is an old-age social security case.8 Of the four major
note cases, one involves old-age social security.9 Thus, of the three
Supreme Court cases dealing with sex-discrimination challenges to the
old-age portion of the social security system,' 0 two are prominently fea-
tured in the authors' treatment of unconstitutional sex discrimination.
In these cases, the norm of sexual equality is used only to chal-
lenge explicit classifications on the basis of sex. Such classifications are
impermissible under these cases unless the distinction compensates
women for past discrimination (benefitting, rather than harming, wo-
men), in which case the classification may be permissible." The au-
thors of the casebook offer extensive comments about whether this
benefit-burden line makes any sense, 12 but they never question whether
the narrow focus on overtly differential treatment of women and men is
an effective method of identifying discrimination within the social se-
8. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1976) (holding differential standards for wid-
ows and widowers applying for old-age survivors' benefits unconstitutional), in
Casebook at 640 and discussed infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text. The other
two major cases are Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking as unconstitutional a
state statute allowing only women to drink 3.2% beer between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one), in Casebook at 616; and Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
(upholding from attack a statutory rape statute defining crime as intercourse "with a
female... under the age of 18 years"), in Casebook at 627.
9. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, in Casebook at 645. The other major note cases are Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking as unconstitutional statutory preference for male
relative as executor of estate of deceased), in Casebook at 612; Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding differential standard of eligibility for dependents' benefits
for male and female spouse of soldier unconstitutional), in Casebook at 613; and
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding constitutional statute requiring only
men to register for draft), in Casebook at 63 1.
10. The third old-age social security case, Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984)
(upholding transitional sex-specific rule) is noted briefly in Casebook at 88, outside the
section on sex discrimination, in connection with a standing issue.
A fourth social security case-involving a challenge to "mother's" benefits rather
than the old-age portion of the system-is discussed briefly in a note. See Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding unconstitutional differential standards for
widowed mothers and widowed fathers applying for social security "mother's" benefits
as survivor of deceased qualified worker), in Casebook at 615. "Mother's" benefits are
benefits paid after the death of a covered worker to his spouse if she is caring for the
deceased's children and if she makes less than $6,480 (1988 limit) a year. 1 Unempl.
Ins. Rep. (CCH) 12,349, at 1119-1119-2, 12,459, at 1265 (1988).
11. Compare Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 216-17 (invalidating gender classifications that
would harm women's dependents in applying for social security) and Weinberger, 420
U.S. at 645 (same) with Webster, 430 U.S. at 318 (upholding gender classifications which
benefit women and compensate for past discrimination), as described infra notes 35-39
and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Casebook at 646-48 (asking whether all laws that create distinctions
between the sexes inevitably discriminate against both because of their close association
and suggesting that the very concept of discrimination against one sex may be incoher-
ent in our society).
266 [Vol. 89:264
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curity system. Nor do they suggest that discrimination might remain in
the social security system after the elimination of explicitly different
treatment of women and men.'3
To be sure, the authors do suggest that the current constitutional
standard is inadequate in other contexts. For example, they include the
major sex-discrimination disparate-impact case, PersonnelAdministrator v.
Feeney,14 which upheld the constitutionality of a state veteran's prefer-
ence statute under which "desirable state civil service employment
[was] an almost exclusively male prerogative."' 5 Both in the note ma-
terial following Feeney 16 and at several other points, the authors ques-
tion the effectiveness of formal equality in eradicating sexual
inequality.' 7 But, with the exception of the Feeney veteran's preference
(which is actually presented in an earlier section on race rather than in
the section on sex discrimination),' 8 the inadequacies of the current
standard for sex discrimination are presented as abstractions.'9
More particularly, the authors never mention the ways in which sex
13. In contrast, the authors note some very tangential and indirect ways in which
sex-based classifications in the social security system might hurt women. See infra note
105.
14. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
15. Id. at 283 (Marshall,J., dissenting); see Casebook at 554-56.
16. See Casebook at 556-57 (questioning whether "the Court's formulation of the
intent requirement in Feeney adequately heed[s] the risk that legislatures will be selec-
tively indifferent to the welfare of politically powerless groups"). But see id. at 624-25,
648 (questioning whether women are a politically powerless group).
17. See, e.g., id. at 623-24. The authors ask whether "it follow[s] from the perva-
siveness of sex-role differentiation that laws reinforcing that differentiation are constitu-
tionally suspect," since facially neutral laws seem to benefit only those few women who
adopt "male" roles and in fact harm many others. This is an important point, but the
authors fail to note its cause: facially neutral laws tend to embody male norms. More
importantly, the authors do not give concrete examples that would illustrate the perva-
siveness (or even the presence) of laws embodying rules designed for men. See infra
note 19 and accompanying text.
18. Feeney is in a section on race titled "Equal Protection Methodology: Heightened
Scrutiny and the Problem of Race," see Casebook at 554, which occurs prior to the sex
discrimination section titled "Equal Protection Methodology: Heightened Scrutiny and
the Problem of Gender," see id. at 610.
19. See, e.g., id. at 623 (questioning effectiveness of gender neutrality in a culture
with deeply embedded sex-role distinctions); id. at 638-39 (asking whether and when
distinctions based on "real" differences should be sustained). The most concrete refer-
ence to possible inadequacies for ordinary adult women in the current system is a refer-
ence to "[p]regnancy, abortion, reproduction, and [the] creation of another human
being" as women's unique experiences. Id. at 639-40. In this context, the authors note
that the current standard entitles women to "'equality only insofar as they are like
men.'" Id. at 640 (quoting Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 955, 1007 (1984). But the authors do not flesh out precisely how these unique
experiences contribute to women's subordinate status. Women and men could, after all,
enjoy equal status, financial security, power, and leisure time even though only women
bear children. For example, employers could be required to give pregnant workers job-
protected leaves of absence for childbirth, and the government could provide unem-
ployment insurance during the leave.
1989]
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discrimination pervades the structure of the social security system irre-
spective of sex-specific classifications. Most law students' only expo-
sure to the social security system occurs in their classes on
constitutional law. If, as I suspect is the case, the authors' presentation
is representative of most classroom discussions of the issue,20 then
most law students graduate with the impression that the Supreme
Court decisions have eliminated sex discrimination in the social secur-
ity system except, perhaps, to the extent that women receive a benefit
denied their spouses under the odd cases allowing some distinctions
beneficial to women. The ongoing struggle between the sexes within
the social security system has been effectively obscured in the
classroom.
On one level, this Commentary is a critique of a particular and pe-
culiar notion of sex discrimination: the current constitutional standard,
which defines sex discrimination as overtly differential treatment of wo-
men and men (unless justified by "real" differences). The current con-
stitutional standard thus requires that similarly situated women and
men be treated the same. When the law incorporates male norms (as it
often does), the current standard requires only that women who are like
men be treated like men. 21 Many feminist scholars have written about
20. In both the selection of cases and the presentation of the social security issue,
the Casebook is quite similar to the other three major constitutional law casebooks: P.
Brest & S. Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking (2d ed. 1983); G.
Gunther, Constitutional Law (11 th ed. 1985); W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar, J. Choper, & S.
Shiffrin, Constitutional Law (1986). Brest and Levinson have three major cases in their
section on sex discrimination, and none of these cases is a social security case. See P.
Brest & S. Levinson, supra, at 576-622. But they discuss each of the three Supreme
Court old-age Social Security cases decided when their book was published in notes at
596-99. Gunther has only two major cases in his section on sex discrimination, and
neither of these cases is a social security case. See id. at 642-69, 737-42. But Califano v.
Webster is one of his twelve major note cases. See id. at 738. Lockhart, Kamisar, Choper,
and Shiffrin use Califano v. Webster, as one of their two major edited cases. And they
include Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, described infra note 35 and accompanying text, and
Califano v. Goldfarb, described infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text, as two of their
six major note cases. Although, like Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, and Tushnet, all of these
authors present the social security cases in some detail, none suggests that there might
be structural discrimination in the system or any problem for women other than the
provisions overtly treating women and men differently.
21. The current constitutional standard is, at least in part, the result of the success-
ful efforts of the American Civil Liberties Union's Women's Rights Project, which liti-
gated for it during the seventies. See Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for
Women's Rights in a Man's World, 2 Law & Inequality 33, 54-58 (1984); Cowan,
Women's Rights Through Litigation: An Examination of the American Civil Liberties
Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 373 (1976); see
also Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims, I 1 J. Fam. L.
347 (1971) (participant in American Civil Liberties Union's Women's Rights Project ap-
plies formal equality as the equal protection standard for sex discrimination). The
Court may also have been influenced by advocates of the Equal Rights Amendment, who
also urged that a formal equality standard be applied to questions of sex discrimination.
268 [Vol. 89:264
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the inadequacy of this notion.22 This Commentary contributes to this
ongoing critique by noting its weaknesses in the context of the social
security system. Modem equal protection doctrine gives lip service to
equality in marginal cases (e.g. social security cases banning express
distinctions between women and men), 23 but leaves intact laws favoring
breadwinners relative to homemakers (the basic structure of the social
security system).24
This Commentary is not, however, primarily a critique of equality
doctrine. I doubt that any abstract standard of equality would entirely
eliminate the bias favoring breadwinners over homemakers in the social
security system.25 But the inevitable shortcomings of a constitutional
standard should not blind us to existing inequalities and the need for
legislative change.
My ultimate purpose is therefore to begin a discussion of how sex
discrimination should be presented in constitutional law casebooks.
Currently, casebooks focus on the leading constitutional cases and the
doctrines therein propounded, with some fairly abstract criticism of the
Court's focus on sexually explicit classifications. Indeed, the authors'
casebook is the best of the current texts in terms of offering students
some exposure to the problems with this focus. 2 6 We do expect consti-
tutional law casebooks to present the doctrine developed by the Court,
with particular attention to the cases important to doctrinal develop-
ment. But it is the essence of formalism to confine analysis to legal
doctrine. Good pedagogy goes beyond the presentation of doctrine to
explore the relationship between doctrine and sound policy.
In a subject as complex as constitutional law, dealing with count-
less historical, social, intellectual, and ideological forces, one cannot
describe everything relevant to every case. One must select. I merely
point out that the authors' casebook, like the other major constitutional
law casebooks, contains a selection of material that tends to obscure,
rather than highlight, women's inequality. Given the common human
See, e.g., Bown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Consti-
tutional Standard for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale LJ. 871 (1971).
22. See, e.g., C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979) [here-
inafter C. Mackinnon, Sexual Harrassment]; C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified
(1987) [hereinafter C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified]; Becker, Prince Charming:
Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201; Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
Calif. L. Rev. 1279 (1987).
23. Some cases have actually harmed women. These cases tend not to be marginal,
but strongly and directly reinforce the existing power structure. See, e.g., infra note 59.
,24. For a somewhat similar analysis of the Supreme Court's standard for racial
equality, see Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1978).
25. See Becker, supra note 22.
26. Compare the authors' section on sex discrimination in Casebook at 610-52 with
P. Brest & S. Levinson, supra note 20, at 576-622, G. Gunther, supra note 20, at
642-69, 737-42 and W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar, J. Choper & S. Shiffrin, supra note 20,
1286-1308.
1989] 269
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tendency to obscure the struggle between the sexes, it is understanda-
ble that authors of constitutional casebooks-who must make difficult
selections from a wealth of material-tend not to highlight the reality
of women's continuing inequality in concrete terms.
Often, law students are able to understand the real issues behind
doctrinal development without explanatory material.27 There is, how-
ever, reason to think that in the context of sex discrimination, students
are likely to need particularly pointed guidance, rather than abstract
hints. Certainly, students are unlikely to appreciate the real issues in
cases dealing with the byzantine social security system without some
information about its structure. Nor is such information of only histori-
cal importance since structural inequality remains in the system to the
present day.
I believe that the authors' casebook would be more effective in
presenting the constitutional law of sex discrimination had they at-
tempted to describe the effect of the current standard on the status of
women. Such a presentation would include material about the heavy
costs associated with the current standard,28 its ineffectiveness in con-
crete contexts like social security, and its benefits. Until such material
is added, it seems quite likely that the struggle will continue to be ob-
scured in the classroom.
This Commentary is divided into three Parts. Part I briefly de-
scribes the Supreme Court's social security cases and discusses in detail
the old-age social security case, Califano v. Goldfarb, included by the au-
thors as one of three full (edited) constitutional sex discrimination
cases in text.29 This section demonstrates that, in and of itself, the dis-
tinction challenged in Goldfarb is trivial 30 in several senses and has al-
ways been trivial on a practical level.
Part II compares the old-age social security system for women and
men. Although explicitly differential treatment of women and men has
been virtually eliminated from the system, 31 it affords a much better
old-age security system for ordinary men than for ordinary women. 32
Part III describes two ways in which these inequities could at least be
partially corrected without increasing the social security taxes paid by
27. Consider, for example, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (upholding
first amendment right to wear jacket with "fuck the draft" patch).
28. In addition to ignoring the ineffectiveness of the current standard in concrete
contexts such as social security, the Casebook entirely ignores the ways in which the
current standard has seriously harmed many women. See infra note 59 (describing a
case in which the current standard has actually harmed women). See also infra sections
II and III (discussing inadequacies of social security system under current standard).
29. 430 U.S. 199 (1977), in Casebook at 640. The other two major cases are de-
scribed supra note 8.
30. For a clarification of this use of "trivial," see infra pp. 274-75.
31. For a discussion of the two remaining transitional differences, see infra note 56.
32. There is no alternative equivalent safety net designed especially to meet the
needs of ordinary women.
[Vol. 89:264
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families. I do not offer any novel insights. These problems and solu-
tions (and others) have long been discussed in the social security litera-
ture and even in law journals33 and were therefore available when the
authors published their casebook in 1986.
Throughout this Commentary, I use "discrimination" broadly to
refer to that which enforces and reinforces women's subordinate status
relative to men, regardless of whether there is "discrimination" under
current legal standards. Subordination refers to the fact that, on a sys-
temic basis, a variety of factors and forces operate in such a way that
women, on average, enjoy less leisure time, financial and physical se-
curity, status, power, and sexual satisfaction than men.3 4 These differ-
ential distributions tend to ensure that, on an individual basis, women
remain subordinated to men, whether on the job or in the home. As a
result, women tend to live lives qualitatively different from the lives of
men. Social security contributes to the differential distribution of finan-
cial security between women and men by affording much better finan-
cial security in old age to those who have successfully fulfilled
traditional male breadwinner roles than to those who have fulfilled fe-
male roles. It thereby contributes to the subordination of individual
women to individual men.
I. THE TmVIALTY OF CALIFANO v. GOLDFARB
The Supreme Court has decided four cases involving challenges to
the social security system on the basis of sex discrimination. The first
two cases held certain sex-specific provisions unconstitutional, 35
33. In addition to the authorities cited at infra note 113, see Note, Women and
Social Security: Seizing the Moment for Change, 70 Geo. L. J. 1563 (1982). For more
recent discussions, see Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 Stan.
L. Rev. 1431 (1986); Note, Should Married Couples Share Social Security Earnings
Credit?, 26J. Fain. L. 601 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Married Couples].
34. On the differential distribution of leisure time, see P. Blumenstein and P.
Schwartz, American Couples 144-48, 151-53 (1983); L. Gilbert, Men in Dual Career
Families: Current Realities and Future Prospects 60-90 (1985);J. H. Pleck, Men's Fam-
ily Work: Three Perspectives and Some New Data, in Work and Family 232 (P.
Voyandoff ed. 1984). On financial security, see Corcoran, Duncan & Hill, The Eco-
nomic Fortunes of Woman and Children: Lessons from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics, i0 Signs 232 (1984). On physical security, see M. Gordon and S. Riger, The
Female Fear (1989). On status and power, see Woman's Research and Educ. Inst. of the
Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues, The American Woman 1987-1988, at
313-14 (1987) (Tables 16-18) (showing the number of women in elective office, in the
judiciary and on the board of directors of Fortune 1000 corporations); Hymowitz and
Schellhardt, The Glass Ceiling, Wall St. J., March 24, 1986, § 4 at 1 (discussing the
difficulty women face breaking into upper management positions). On sexual satisfac-
tion, see A. Dworkin, Intercourse (1987); S. Estrich, Real Rape 10-15 (1987); C. MacK-
innon, A Feminist/Political Approach: Pleasure Under Patriarchy from Theories of
Human Sexuality (J. Gear & W. O'Donohue eds. 1987); L. Rubin, Worlds of Pain
134-54 (1976).
35. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977) (striking down rule that only
surviving widower must show dependency to be eligible for old-age survivor's benefits);
1989]
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whereas the later cases upheld other sex-specific provisions.3 6 The line
drawn by the Court in these cases depends upon the reason (in the
Court's view) that the legislature adopted the sex-specific classification.
If the classification is based on stereotypical impressions of traditional
differences between the sexes, then the classification is unconstitu-
tional.3 7 If the classification is based on the desire to compensate wo-
men for past discrimination38 or to protect (transitional) reliance on
earlier sex-based social security provisions,3 9 then sex-specific classifi-
cations are constitutional.
From these four cases, the authors have selected Califano v. Goldfarb
as one of only three major (edited) cases in the section on the constitu-
tional standard for equal protection in the context of sex discrimina-
tion.40 In Goldfarb, plaintiffs challenged provisions under which
widowers were entitled to survivors' retirement benefits only if they
showed dependency on their deceased wives, whereas widows were au-
tomatically entitled to survivors' benefits. The Court held that the dis-
tinction was unconstitutional because either similarly situated women
and men were treated differently as wage earners or because similarly
situated widowers and widows were treated differently after the death
of their spouse.41 Despite its prominent position in the authors'
casebook, the case is trivial from several perspectives.
First, it is trivial in the sense that the challenged provision affected
very few people.42 It authorized the payment of retirement benefits to
a widower as a dependent spouse of a deceased, covered worker only if
the widower first proved that he was dependent on his deceased wife.43
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (striking down rule that only
mothers are eligible for "mother's benefits" as caretaker of deceased workers' children).
36. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (upholding a transitional rule
under which only husband need show dependency to be eligible for spouse's old-age
benefit without offset for his own government pension); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313 (1977) (upholding a rule allowing women to exclude more low-income years than
men in calculating benefit levels).
37. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 207, 211, 217 (denial to spouses of deceased female work-
ers benefits available to spouses of deceased male workers based on "archaic and over-
broad" generalizations); Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 643 (considering "archaic and
overbroad" the assumption that only mothers need survivors' benefits after death of
covered wage earner).
38. See Webster, 430 U.S. at 317-21 (concluding that Congress allowed women to
exclude more low-income years than men in calculating benefit levels to compensate for
past discrimination in wages and economic opportunities).
39. See Mathews, 465 U.S. at 742-44 (concluding that transitional provision incor-
porating earlier sex-specific provision, i.e., that only male spouses need show depen-
dency, was based on reliance on sex-specific provision, rather than on desire to
perpetuate "archaic and overbroad" generalizations).
40. For a description of the other major cases in the Casebook, see supra note 8.
41. Four of the Justices in the majority said the former, see 430 U.S. at 206-07;
Justice Stevens, the fifth majority Justice, said the latter, see id. at 217-24.
42. For a discussion of this use of "trivial," see infra p. 274.
43. For a similar analysis of Goldfarb, see Simon, supra note 33, at 1478-82.
272 [Vol. 89:264
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But most widowers are not eligible for spouses' benefits, regardless of
whether they can show dependency, because one can claim as a spouse
of a deceased covered worker only if one's own benefits as a covered
worker are less than the deceased spouse's benefits. The vast majority
of widowers draw greater social security benefits as retired workers
than as the surviving spouses of deceased, covered worker wives be-
cause most men earn more than their wives. For example, although
almost all female and male applicants were subject to the same rules in
1985,44 99.36% of those receiving benefits as widowed spouses were
widows and only 0.635% widowers. Indeed, in the entire country only
30,182 men received benefits as widowers at the end of 1985, whereas
4,725,618 women received benefits as widows.45
At the time of the decision most of the widowers affected by Gold-
farb were men not covered by social security at all because they worked
in exempt fields such as state or federal government. In Goldfarb itself
the reason Leon Goldfarb's draw as a dependent on his deceased wife's
account was larger than his draw on his own account as a retired worker
was that Leon had worked for the federal government and was there-
fore exempt from the social security system. Leon Goldfarb was not an
unusual man injured by Congress's reliance on "archaic and over-
broad" 46 stereotypes. Instead, he was apparently a (stereo)typical man
in a position consistent with Congress's sex-linked expectations. Gold-
farb argued, in effect, that because some women were allowed a double
dip into both the social security retirement system and the federal em-
ployees' retirement system, he too should be allowed a double dip even
though he was not, and had never been, economically dependent on his
wife.47
As noted, at the time Goldfarb was decided most male workers
earned more than their wives and were covered by the social security
system. Goldfarb did not, therefore, affect most men one way or the
other. Since then, the social security system has steadily expanded to
cover almost all workers. 48 For instance, federal employees hired after
44. At that time, as now, only two sex-specific distinctions remained in the system.
See infra note 56. It is quite unlikely that the elimination of these distinctions would
have made a dramatic change in the number of widowers applying for benefits as wid-
owed retirees.
45. Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 154 (1987) (Table 70).
46. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1973); Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 207,
211, 217. For contextual explanation, see supra note 37.
47. The rationale for allowing women to double dip was that women were more
likely than men to be economically dependent on their social security-covered spouses.
If forced to choose between social security dependents' benefits and their own federal
employee pension benefits, more women would tend to choose social security depen-
dents' benefits, thus forfeiting their contributions to the federal employees' pension sys-
tem. Today, all double dipping is prohibited except for some transitional sex-specific
tolerance of double dipping by some older retirees. See infra note 56.
48. An estimated 90% of workers are now covered by the social security system.
Social Security Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, Social Se-
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December 31, 1983, are covered by the social security system.49 The
issue is, therefore, even less important today than it was at the time of
decision.50
Scholars of equal protection may find this use of "trivial" odd.
The point of equal protection doctrine is to protect certain minorities
from the majority,5' regardless of the numbers involved. In constitu-
tional law, principle is paramount.
In achieving equality for women, however, what matters (to a very
large extent) is numbers -results-not abstract principles. Women
constitute fifty-two percent of the population.52 Yet systemic discrimi-
nation against women pervades our society.55 Goldfarb does nothing
significant about the problems women face. Relative to the changes
necessary to achieve equality between the sexes, it is trivial.54
From the perspective of women's equality, the case is trivial in an-
other sense: it involves a challenge to the award of benefits to a man.55
Furthermore, the woman who had made the relevant contributions to
the system was dead. One would expect the case to have had only the
most limited effect on the status of women in the real world during
curity Handbook 6 (1986). This percentage will increase in the future because all fed-
eral employees are now covered. Id.
49. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(4)(A), (c)(2)(A) (1982); Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S.
728, 731-33 (1984).
50. The other three Supreme Court social security cases alleging sex discrimination
are also trivial in the sense that they made little practical difference at the time of deci-
sion. Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636 (striking down as unconstitutional rule that only mothers
are eligible for "mothers' benefits" as caretakers of deceased worker's children), was of
little practical importance because an earnings limit excludes most men (and dispropor-
tionately more men than women). For example, in 1989 a father (or mother) cannot
earn more than $6,480 and qualify. I Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 12,459, at 1265 (Nov.
8, 1988). Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding as constitutional a provi-
sion allowing women to exclude more low-income years in calculating benefits), was of
little practical importance because the provision applied, even at the time the case was
decided, to women who reached 62 prior to 1975. It was, therefore, only a transitional
distinction and of decreasing importance over time. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728
(1984) (upholding as constitutional a rule requiring male spouses in certain circum-
stances to show dependency), was marginal in the sense that it too involved a transi-
tional rule.
51. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 716-17 (1985);
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 Yale L. J.
1287, 1294-97 (1982).
52. Bureau of the Census, Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1988, at 15 (Table 16) (1987) (projection).
53. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
54. In 1985, for example, it affected only 30,182 men (whose relatively powerful
wives were dead) out of a total national population of 238,740,000-most of whom
were women. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1988, at 16 (Table 17) (1987) (1985 data).
55. The Women's Rights Project of the ACLU consciously adopted a policy of us-
ing male plaintiff's in sex-discrimination cases during the seventies. See Cole, supra
note 21, at 54-55; Cowan, supra note 21, at 394-95.
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their lives and marriages. True, after Goldfarb, a very few working wo-
men and retired women workers (those who earned more than their
husbands or whose husbands were not covered by social security) could
sleep more soundly knowing that in the event of their deaths, their wid-
owers would receive more money. But these women tend to be rela-
tively powerful. The case will not make any significant change in the
status of those women most in need of change. The change may have
been worth making, depending on the costs associated with it, but one
would not imagine that it did much good.
Scholars of equal protection may again find my use of "trivial"
odd. Equal protection doctrine tends to regard discrimination against
women and men as parallel (and equally troubling) events. But sex dis-
crimination does not leave men and women similarly situated; its mean-
ing for men is not symmetrical to its meaning for women. Like women,
men may be constrained by stereotypes and social pressures. Never-
theless, men tend to come out on top, which is not at all the same as
being constrained and coming out on the bottom. Sex discrimination
subordinates women to men on a systemic basis in our society, but not
vice versa. Thus, awarding benefits to men whose wives are dead is
trivial because the award is unlikely to affect at all women's subordinate
status, which should be at the center of the equal protection doctrine of
sex discrimination.
Today, as was true at the time the authors' casebook was published
in 1986, Goldfarb is trivial in a third sense. The issue is largely moot as a
result of legislative change. In response to cases like Goldfarb, all sex-
specific classifications have been eliminated from the social security sys-
tem except for a couple of minor transitional provisions.56
Perhaps the social security cases are of historical importance to the
development of the constitutional law of sex discrimination. 57 If
56. Two transitional sex-specific rules remain in the social security system. With
respect to counting years for the benefit calculation, special rules apply to men who
reached 62 prior to 1975. 1 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 12,205, at 1052 (Nov. 17,
1987). And there is still a distinction with respect to a husband attempting to prove
dependency in order to avoid an offset for his own federal employee's pension from his
social security claim as his wife's dependent. But even with respect to this rule, only
individuals eligible for spousal benefits in January 1977 are affected by the sex-specific
treatment. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 402 note on Offset Against Spouses' Benefits on Account
of Public Pensions (West Supp. III 1985) (earlier and virtually identical version of this
transitional provision upheld in Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984)).
57. The Supreme Court has heard only four social security cases involving claims of
sex discrimination. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. Since 1971, when
the Court first struck down a rule on the ground that it discriminated on the basis of sex
in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), there have been dozens of constitutional sex dis-
crimination challenges in other contexts. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (single-sex nursing school); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1978)
(alimony statute); Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977), summarily af-
firming 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) (single-sex high schools); Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7 (1975) (child support obligation dependent on sex of child); Turner v. Dept. of
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Goldfarb is retained in the Casebook for this reason, it surely would be
relevant to note that the Court developed its constitutional standard for
sex equality in trivial cases. It seems likely that development in such a
context might affect the effectiveness of a substantive standard. If Gold-
farb and the other three Supreme Court constitutional social security
cases are not of great historical importance, however, they should be
replaced by cases that are of greater historical importance or that raise
more important and timely issues. 58 Such cases do exist.59
The social security sex-discrimination cases are trivial in another,
more important sense. They ignore the real inequities of the social se-
curity system from the perspective of women.
II. STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
The social security cases and the authors' presentation of them
suggest that the major sex-discrimination problem with social security
is historical: in the past, the system discriminated against women who
were like men by treating them differently from men. In fact, the major
problem with social security was and is its treatment of ordinary women,
women who are primarily responsible for domestic production and re-
production and who often participate, on a limited basis, in wage em-
ployment. The social security system is structured to afford greater
financial security in old age to breadwinners than to full or part-time
homemakers. Thus, the major problem from the perspective of wo-
men's inequality is not, as the cases suggest, that the social security
system has treated the atypical woman differently from a similar man,
but rather that it gives less effective old-age financial security to typical
women than to typical men.60
Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (pregnancy); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) (pregnancy).
58. Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313 (1977) (upholding constitutionality of allowing
women to exclude more low-earning years in calculating benefits than men) could be
used to present a number of interesting sex discrimination issues, including the costs of
formal equality (at the time of decision, the differential was already being phased out)
and the strongest justification for the distinction (not the generic past discrimination
referred to by the Court, but the present discrimination women face, including the struc-
ture of the social security system).
59. To my mind, a far more important case in terms of the constitutional history of
women's inequality is Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding state statute providing
for alimony to be paid only to [some] women unconstitutional). See Becker, supra note
22, at 219-22 (arguing that Orr and the approach to equality it reflected and reinforced
contributed to the increasingly serious postdivorce impoverishment of women and chil-
dren). But the Casebook does not include any consideration of how the current stan-
dard has weakened women's (and children's) economic position. See, e.g., Casebook at
623-24 (suggesting only the nebulous harm of legitimating the status quo).
60. In response to an early version of this Commentary, the authors of. the
Casebook include the following explanation in their 1988 Supplement:
In the social security system, the real problem is that three classes are estab-
lished: those who qualify under ordinary standards; dependents; and those who
[Vol. 89:264
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Elderly women are more likely to be podr than elderly men. For
example, although the overall poverty rate for those sixty-five and older
in 1986 was 12.4%,61 the rate for elderly women was 15.2%.62 Women
without men were especially likely to be poor. The poverty level for
elderly widows was 20.9%, and the rate for elderly divorced women
was 25.4%.63 A longitudinal study of older couples over a ten-year pe-
riod found that widows were much more vulnerable to poverty than
married couples because, in part, many assets evaporated or shrank
with the death of the husband.64 At the end of the study period (1979),
37% of the widows were poor, whereas fewer than 10% of the couples
were.
65
It is not only that women live longer than men and therefore ex-
haust their savings and other resources. Both public and private in-
come-support systems for the elderly afford much better protection for
men than for women. For example, men are more likely to have private
pensions (because male-dominated industries and jobs are more likely
to offer them) and to have larger private pensions (because, like social
security, most private pension benefits are keyed to preretirement in-
come). 66 Thus, social security is especially important for women. Yet
social security works better for men than for women.
Women receive about 52% of social security benefits paid to the
elderly.67 But because women live longer than men, 60% of elderly
social security beneficiaries are women. 68 These figures show that eld-
do not qualify at all. The social security system protects the first group quite
well, the second group less well, and the third group not at all. For purposes of
sex equality, the problem is that as the group becomes increasingly female, it is
decreasingly protected.
Casebook at 97 (Supp. 1988). This is a welcome addition. The authors need to explain,
however, that the system was designed to reward men's, and ignore women's, contribu-
tions to society (by affording a better safety net to those fulfilling traditional men's roles
than to those fulfilling traditional women's roles), and to explicitly encourage women's,
but not men's, dependency (by linking only women's financial security to continued rela-
tionships with covered workers). See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text. With-
out reference to concrete facts such as these, the reader might be left with the
impression that women are less well protected due to an accident of design or because
they are somehow less deserving.
61. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Current Population Reports,
Special Studies, Series P-60 No. 160, Poverty in the U.S.: 1986, at 55 (Table 11) (1988).
62. Id. at 58.
63. Id.
64. Hurd & Wise, The Wealth and Poverty of Widows: Assets Before and After the
Husband's Death, at 18-23 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
2325) (July 1987).
65. Id. at 8.
66. See, e.g., Hess, Aging Policies and Old Women: The Hidden Agenda, in Gen-
der and the Life Course 319, 321 (A. Rossi ed. 1985).
67. Social Security Administration, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Social
Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1987, at 216 (Table 130) [hereinafter
1987 Statistical Supplement].
68. Id.
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erly women tend to receive less, on average, than elderly men. Part of
the problem is that a retired worker's benefits are tied to the worker's
own wage 69 and women tend to earn less than men in the wage-labor
market.70 As a result, women drawing benefits as covered workers tend
to receive smaller benefits than men drawing benefits as covered work-
ers. For example, for social security benefits paid at the end of 1985 to
individuals collecting on their own accounts as retired workers, women
received an average monthly benefit of $412.10, whereas men received
an average monthly benefit of $538.40. 71 Moreover, wives and di-
vorced wives received an average dependents' benefit of only
$247.20. 72 Widows and surviving divorced wives received more: an av-
erage of $445.10.73 In every category, whether collecting as independ-
ent covered workers or as dependents of male workers, women
received, on average, less than male workers.
One might object that, regardless of the data just presented, the
system does not discriminate on the basis of sex because women re-
ceive a far greater portion of benefits than their contributions war-
rant.74 Women make only about 28% of contributions to the social
security system, yet they collect about 54%o of benefits. 75 This perspec-
tive ignores, however, the traditional division of labor within marriage.
Traditionally, at least according to the norm, men were entirely re-
sponsible for the economic welfare of their wives and families; wives
were entirely responsible for domestic production and reproduction. 76
Under a traditional marital division of labor, one would expect women
(at least once married) to make 0%o of the contributions, but to receive
59.4% of old-age benefits, since 59.4% of the elderly are women. 7 7
69. 42 U.S.C. 415 (d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
70. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Money and Income Poverty
Status in the United States: 1987, Current Population Reports, Consumer Income, Se-
ries P-60, No. 161, at 5 (Aug. 1988) (1987 data) [hereinafter Consumer Income].
71. See 1987 Statistical Supplement at 145-46 (Table 70).
72. This statistic was extracted from id. at 150 (Table 70). As noted below, this
differential is less troubling for wives than divorced wives. See infra notes 90-98 and
accompanying text. The wife lives with the retired worker who is drawing, on average,
$538.40.
73. See Consumer Income, supra note 70, at 169 (Table 83) (1987).
74. See, e.g., Munnell & Stiglin, Women and a Two-Tier Social Security System, in
A Challenge to Social Security: The Changing Roles of Women and Men in American
Society 101, 106 (R. Burkhauser & K. Holden eds. 1982).
75. See id. These percentages apply to the system as a whole, including such items
as disability and mother's and father's benefits.
76. For a more detailed discussion of the economic partnership underlying most
marriages, see infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
77. U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1022,
United States Population Estimates by Age, Sex, and Race: 1980-1987, at 121 (Table 1)
(1987) (1987 estimate). Needs do not, of course, decrease with advancing age. If any-
thing, they increase. One would therefore expect the traditional division of economic
responsibilities to result in a little more old-age security for women than men if the
sexes are to maintain the same economic level during old-age.
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Given the traditional division of labor-which still holds to some extent
in almost all families 7 8 -there is no reason to conclude that because
54% of old age and disability benefits are paid to women, the social
security system does not discriminate on the basis of sex. Even with a
modified form of the traditional division of labor in marriage, one
would not expect women's benefits to correlate to women's
contributions.
Indeed, the general data described above indicate that social secur-
ity is a better old-age security system for men because, on an individual
basis, men receive more than women, despite the greater need women
have due to their greater longevity. There are-and have always
been-three major problems with social security from a sex-discrimi-
nation perspective, all related to the system's preference for those suc-
cessfully fulfilling traditional male roles over those fulfilling traditional
female roles. First, for an individual filing an independent claim, old-
age benefit levels are linked to wages,79 and earning high wages is a
traditional male (breadwinner) role.8 0 Second, women cannot combine
domestic and wage-labor production in accruing social security bene-
fits, though most women work both in the home and in the market for
wages depressed by their domestic responsibilities.8 1 Third, depen-
dents' benefits (which belong mostly to women) tend to be smaller and
more contingent than workers' benefits; divorced dependents receive
particularly small and contingent benefits.8 2
The first of these problems needs little explanation. Full-time,
year-round women workers tend to earn less than similarly situated
men in the wage-labor market. In 1987 full-time women workers
78. P. Roos, Gender and Work: A Comparative Analysis of Industrial Societies
16-19 (1985); G. Staines &J. Pleck, The Impact of Work Schedules on the Family 59-63
(1983); Vanek, Household Work, Wage Work, and Sexual Equality, in Women and
Household Labor 275, 276 (S. Berk ed. 1980).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 415(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
80. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text. The treatment of divorced wo-
men will become increasingly problematic as increasing numbers of divorced people
reach retirement age. In 1986, "only" 702,000 women 65 and older were divorced and
not remarried (or 4.4% of women in that cohort). Extracted from U.S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988, at 40 (Ta-
ble 48) (1987). But in that same year, 15% of women between the ages of 35-44 were
divorced, or 2,473,000 women, Extracted from id.
The financial insecurity of divorced women does not, of course, affect only currently
divorced women. Many women remain married because of financial pressure. And di-
vorced women often remarry for the same reason. In all likelihood, the vast majority of
women experience these financial pressures-to marry and to remain married to men-
at some time in their lives. A recent study estimates that two-thirds of all first marriages
are now likely to end in divorce. T. Castro & L. Bumpass, Recent Trends and Differen-
tials in Martial Disruption, Center for Demography & Ecology, University of
Wisconsin-Madison (Mar. 1988) (on file at Columbia Law Review).
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earned only 65 ¢ for every $1.00 earned by full-time male workers.83 By
linking life-time wages and old-age security,84 social security inevitably
creates a better security system for men than for women85
The second problem is that women cannot combine domestic and
wage-labor production in accruing social security benefits. Social se-
curity recognizes the value of women's domestic contributions to the
household economy only indirectly through the award of dependents'
benefits. Younger women often combine limited wage work with do-
mestic responsibilities, typically working only part time or not at all for
several years while their children are young. These women must
choose between their claims as dependents and their claims as workers;
they cannot combine both domestic and wage labor in building their
retirement rights. Many women in this situation draw dependents' ben-
efits because they are greater than their benefits as independent (but
intermittent and typically low-paid) wage workers.86 For these women,
direct contributions to social security through wage work do not count
at all.
87
83. Extracted from Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Median In-
comes of MIF, Current Population Reports, Special Studies, Series P-60 No. 161, at 5
(1988).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 415(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
85. The link between wages and benefits is part of what makes social security, to
some extent, social insurance rather than a need-based social safety net. For discussions
of whether social security is an insurance or welfare system, see Altman, The Reconcilia-
tion of Retirement Security and Tax Policies: A Response to Professor Graetz, 136 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1419, 1424-32 (1988); Simon, supra note 33, at 1458-59. For a discussion
of how safety nets for men are structured as social insurance whereas those for women
are structured as welfare, see Fraser, Women, Welfare and The Politics of Need Inter-
pretation, 2 Hypatia 103, 108-13 (1987); Nelson, Women's Poverty and Women's Citi-
zenship: Some Political Consequences of Economic Marginality, 10 Signs 209, 221-23
(1984); Pearce, Toil and Trouble: Women Workers and Unemployment Compensation,
in Women and Poverty (1986).
Neither of the changes to social security suggested at infra notes 117-126 and ac-
companying text eliminate the link between a couple's wages and a couple's benefits.
86. Of women awarded old-age benefits in 1986,49.9% received benefits as depen-
dents rather than as independent workers. Extracted from 1987 Statistical Supplement,
supra note 67, at 121-22 (Table 46). Only 50% of women received benefits as in-
dependent workers. Id. (These calculations exclude that very small group of elderly
women receiving benefits as the widowed mothers of covered workers.)
Many of the 49.9% of women receiving dependents' benefits in 1986 worked for
wages at some point in their lives, but drew dependents' benefits because they were
larger than their benefits as independent workers. (As a dependent, a widow draws a full
worker's benefit of 100% PIA, see infra note 91 and accompanying text; unless a widow
earned as much as her husband, she will claim as a dependent rather than as a worker.)
The Office of the Actuary of Social Security has estimated that in 1980, 12% of women
beneficiaries were entitled to benefits as dependents and as workers (though, of course,
drawing only one type of benefit). By 2000, 17% of women beneficiaries are expected to
be in this position; 19% by 2020, and 22% by 2040. See Fierst, Discussion, in A Chal-
lenge to Social Security, supra note 74, at 66, 68 (Table 3.10).
87. Or, to put it another way:
[F]amilies which contribute equal amounts into the system and have equal
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Social security, as currently structured, is incapable of giving wo-
men credit for both wage employment and domestic production and
reproduction. It cannot, therefore, track society's expectations of ordi-
nary women 88
The third problem is that women's claims as dependents are
smaller and more contingent in a number of ways than workers' claims.
This becomes clear by looking at wives' and widows' benefits during
old age and at ex-wives' benefits. In general, the treatment of wives
and widows is not too troubling. A worker who retires at full retire-
ment age, sixty-five today, is entitled to one full draw (100% Primary
Insurance Amount ("PIA")) from the time he retires to his death.8 9
During the life of the worker, the wife receives 50% of his PIA provided
that both she and her husband have reached sixty-five.90 Since they are
presumably living together and sharing his 100% PIA, this means that
she lives in a household collecting 150% PIA. If he has died, she re-
ceives 100% PIA from age sixty-five to her death91 unless-and this is
troubling"-she remarried prior to reaching the age of sixty, in which
case her claim evaporates. 92
Termination of her claim on remarriage might seem appropriate.
After all, almost all men over sixty-five are covered by social security,
and she will again be in a household eligible for 150% of her new hus-
band's PIA. The new husband may, however, be entitled to smaller
benefits than her first husband or may only be eligible for retirement at
a later date. In either event, her marriage will not result in an increased
draw on his account equal to 50% of her first husband's PIA and will
destroy her claim based on her marital partnership with the deceased
worker.
earnings over their lifetimes can receive substantially different OASI benefits
depending on how the earnings were divided between the husband and wife.
Because benefits received by a single-earner couple are often higher than those
received by a two-earner couple with identical combined lifetime earnings, the
provision of spouse benefits is often considered an unjustified income transfer
to wives of higher earners, or to result in redundant OASI taxes paid by work-
ing wives.
Burkhauser & Holden, Introduction, in A Challenge to Social Security, supra note 74, at
1,4.
88. At the time the dependents' provisions were added to social security in 1939,
25% of women participated in the wage-labor market. For 15% of households, both
spouses worked in the wage-labor market. Id. at 10. Today, 56%o of women 20 years of
age and older work. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employment and
Earnings, Apr. 1988, at 58 (Table A-58) (1988). About the same proportion of married
women, 56.5%, work, according to first quarter 1988 data. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Dept. of Labor, Press Release (Table 5) (Apr. 27, 1988).
89. 1 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 12,301, at 1073-2 (1988).
90. Id. 12,309, at 1087.
91. Id. 12,341, at 1111-13.
92. Id. at 1110-11. Her claim may, however, rise again if she divorces the second
husband and can collect more as the dependent of the first covered worker to whom she
was married than as the dependent of the second. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(C) (1982).
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Remarriage never has a similar effect on men's claims. Regardless
of marital status, the independent worker is entitled to 100% PIA from
age sixty-five to death; marriage can only increase his household's draw
from 100% to 150%P 3
The treatment of divorced wives is rather different from the treat-
ment of wives and widows. A divorced wife is not entitled to any bene-
fits unless the marriage lasted for at least ten years.94 At that point she
is fully vested as a dependent, provided she does not remarry.9 5 The
ordinary worker never faces the possibility that if he leaves his em-
ployer-or, for that matter, his spouse-he will lose his social security
claim. A full-time homemaker who is divorced after nine years of mar-
riage walks away with no social security credit for that period.
A second problem for an ex-wife is that she can begin drawing so-
cial security retirement benefits during the life of the worker only if
both she and the worker have reached the requisite retirement age.9 6
This makes little sense as a retirement security system for an ex-wife.9 7
A man's right to retirement benefits depends, of course, only on his
own age.
A third problem for the divorced wife is the level of benefits during
the life of the worker. If the divorced wife-who was married for at
least ten years-begins to draw benefits at age sixty-five, she gets 50%
of the worker's PIA.9 8 Thus, after divorce, the single retired man gets
twice what his ex-wife gets-no matter how long the marriage. And if
he is remarried, he (and the new wife) receive three times what the ex-
wife receives.
Fourth, although the retired worker's remarriage can only increase
93. See supra note 90.
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402 (b), (e), 416(d)(1)-(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). As indicated
earlier, wives are eligible for benefits when the marriage has lasted one year. Widows
are eligible after nine months of marriage prior to the covered worker's death. Id.
§ 416(b)-(c).
95. Id. §§ 402 (b), (e), 416(d)(1)-(2). Her ultimate draw will depend on the ulti-
mate earnings record of the covered worker to whom she was married.
96. Id. § 402(b)(1).
97. During marriage, linking the dependent wife's benefit to the husband's retire-
ment makes some sense, since prior to his retirement the couple does not need income
support to replace his wages. If divorced women received adequate alimony prior to the
ex-husband's retirement, they would be in a similar position. But the vast majority of
divorced women are not awarded any alimony. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Child Support and Alimony: 1985, at 6 (Table G) (1987) (of ever-divorced
or currently-separated women in 1985, only 14.6%o had ever been awarded alimony).
And many who are awarded some alimony are unable to collect it. Id. In addition,
alimony awards are increasingly tending to be short term (e.g., for a four-year period).
See, e.g., Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1225-26 (1981)
(study of two California counties). Given the tenuous nature of the link between most
divorced women and their ex-husbands, her old-age income support should not depend
on his retirement.
98. 1 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 12,309, at 1087 (1988).
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his household's draw, the divorced wife's remarriage-before or after
the worker's death-may terminate her claim. Prior to the ex-hus-
band's death, remarriage by the divorced wife will terminate her social
security claim (after a marriage of ten years or more) unless she marries
someone who claims benefits as one of several specified categories of
dependents. 99 Since most men claim benefits as. covered workers
rather than as dependents, for most divorced wives this means that her
remarriage during the life of the ex-husband terminates her social se-
curity claim no matter how long the marriage.100
After the workers' death, the rules about remarriage of the di-
vorced wife change to match the rules applicable to widows described
above: if she marries before she reaches age sixty, her claim terminates;
if she marries after reaching sixty, remarriage does not affect her
claim. 10
Thus, in a number of important respects, the social security system
fails to afford women as reliable an old-age security system as that af-
forded men. The problems with the system are obvious, not subtle.
Women who lead ordinary lives are less likely to be well protected by
the social security system than men who live ordinary lives because the
system prefers those who have successfully fulfilled men's traditional
breadwinner role over those who fulfilled women's traditional roles.
Social security discriminates against women because it is designed so
that women are at a much greater risk of poverty than are men. It ex-
erts pressure on homemakers to depend economically on men in old
age, despite the riskiness of such dependence. Indeed, the system bla-
tantly contributes to the subordination of women to men on an individ-
ual basis by linking old-age security for women (but not for men) to
continuation of the marriage bond until death.'0 2
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1)(C), 402(b)(3) (1982 & Supp IV 1986). Under the stat-
ute, a divorced woman's claim terminates unless she marries someone entitled to retire-
ment benefits in one of the following ways: as a divorced husband of a covered worker;
as the widower of a covered worker; or as a father taking care of the children of a de-
ceased covered worker and earning less than $6480 (in 1988), see 1 Unempl. Ins. Rep.
(CCH) 12,459, at 1265 (1988); as the retired dependent parent of a deceased covered
worker; or as someone originally entitled to benefits as the disabled child of a retired,
deceased, or disabled covered worker.
100. The marriage must have lasted at least 10 years or she has no claim. A claim
based on a first marriage of at least 10 years revives if the woman divorces her second
husband. See 1 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 12,309, at 1086 (1985). She can then draw
the greater of the two benefits. See id. 12,367, at 1157-4 (1986).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e)(1)(A), (e)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
102. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing termination of widows'
benefits for women who remarry before reaching age 60); supra notes 94-101 and ac-
companying text (discussing divorced wives' claims).
There have been two Supreme Court cases in which plaintiffs argued that social
security distinctions between wives or widows and divorcees were unconstitutional:
Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 342 (1986) (upholding provisions in effect between 1979 and
1983, which authorized payment of survivor's old-age benefits to covered worker's
widow who remarried after 60 but not to a similarly situated divorced wife who remar-
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The sexual inequity within the social security system illustrates a
general problem with the current constitutional standard. That stan-
dard, by banning distinctions on the basis of sex, 103 requires only that
men and women be treated the same. The standard incorporates a
male norm,1 04 so that women are only entitled to be treated as men are
treated. In the context of social security, this does not mean that wo-
men are entitled to as much old-age security as men in a way appropri-
ate given society's quite different expectations of them. Instead,
women are constitutionally entitled only to be treated as wage earners
(men) are treated under the standards developed for those expected to
be their families' breadwinners.
Thus, despite the prominent position of Califano v. Goldfarb in the
authors' casebook, the differential treatment of widowers who earned
less than their deceased wives (relative to widows in a similar position)
has never been a significant aspect of the subordination of women
through the social security system. In contrast, the structure of the so-
cial security system (ignored by the case and by the casebook) ties wo-
men's old-age economic security to their continuing relationships with
individual men and to their performance in a market that pays them less
than it pays men, thereby encouraging economic dependence on indi-
vidual men. Such factors have always been a key part of women's sub-
ordination to men. In the context of social security, the casebook
ignores what is critically important from the perspective of women's
equality and focuses exclusively on the trivial, obscuring, in the pro-
cess, the actual ongoing sexual inequity of the system.105
ried) and Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (upholding act providing for bene-
fits for a wife, but not an ex-wife, under 62 with a retired or disabled husband receiving
social security provided she has a minor child of his in her care). In both cases, the
distinctions were upheld as possibly based on rational (though perhaps inaccurate) per-
ceptions of differences. The Court never mentioned the obvious benefit to men of hav-
ing their wives' financial security turn on continued marriage. This is irrelevant under
the rational-basis standard. And because the distinction was not overtly sex-specific, the
Court did not use the heightened scrutiny appropriate in cases of sex-discrimination.
103. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text; see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268(1979) (striking down law requiring payment of alimony by husbands only); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 70 (1971) (invalidating law that favored males as administrators of intes-
tate decedents).
104. For general discussions of such problems, see, e.g., C. MacKinnon, Sexual
Harrassment, supra note 22, at 101-27; C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra
note 22, at 32-45; Becker, supra note 22, at 206-12, 214-24; Law, supra note 19,
1007-08. The authors of the Casebook include a note, quoting Professor Law, on the
unspoken male norm within the current constitutional standard. See Casebook at
639-40. Yet the current constitutional standard incorporates a male norm only to the
extent that the laws to which it applies do so. A requirement of facial neutrality need not
itself be discriminatory. These points are ignored by the authors. See supra notes 17 &
19. .
105. In the context of social security, the authors point out some very tangential
ways in which sex-based classifications might harm women. See Casebook at 648-49
(suggesting that a problem in requiring widower but not widow to show dependency
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Even if appropriate adjustments to the system were difficult to im-
agine, the casebook should give a more accurate understanding of the
problems women face in relying on either the social security system or
the Constitution. It is not, however, difficult to imagine some partial
solutions to the problems with the social security system. Suggestions
about possible changes could be included in note material along with
information about the structural problems in the social security system
from the viewpoint of women's equality.
III. PARTIAL SOLUTIONS TO SEXUAL INEQUITIES IN THE SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM
A number of solutions to the problems discussed above have re-
ceived considerable attention over the last twenty-five years.' 0 6 As
early as 1963, there was concern about the treatment of women under
the social security system. In that year, the Committee on Social Insur-
ance and Taxes of the President's Commission on the Status of Women
looked at the treatment of working wives and suggested some changes
to the system.10 7 In 1967, legislation was introduced in Congress to
equalize the treatment of one- and two-earner couples through a "com-
bined earning plan."' 0 8 During the following years, this and other ad-
justments to improve the system's treatment of women were proposed.
For example, in 1972 and 1974, legislation was introduced giving social
security credit for work in the home.' 0 9 Since 1976, earnings sharing
has been repeatedly considered by various entities." 0 In 1977, Con-
gress ordered the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to
study social security's treatment of women, and in 1979 it published its
might be that such a rule reinforces "stereotypes of dependence and passivity that make
women the losers in the long run"); id. at 650 (suggesting that sex-based social security
classifications, even when "favorable" to women in the Court's view, might harm women
by reinforcing old stereotypes). The 1988 Supplement does, in response to my criti-
cisms, refer to the fact that the social security system is a much better safety net for men
than for women. But see supra note 60.
106. See Note, Married Couples, supra note 33, at 608-13.
107. The Committee recommended that a working wife be given a part of her hus-
band's earnings (her dependent's share) together with credit for her own wage work.
Staff of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Earnings
Sharing Implementation Study 241 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter Earnings Sharing
Study].
108. Id. ("Combined earnings plans generally would allow married couples at re-
tirement to combine their past earnings credits up to the amount of the contribution and
benefit base each year and for the couple to receive 150 percent of benefit based on
combined earnings."); see infra notes 116-123 and accompanying text (discussing earn-
ings sharing).
109. Id. at 241-44. This suggestion becomes somewhat less radical when one con-
siders that for many years, members of the armed forces received social security credit
without making social security contributions. See 1 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH)
12,501-12,505 (1988).
110. Earnings Sharing Study, supra note 107, at 242-44.
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report suggesting,comprehensive changes to the system, including, as
one of two options, earnings sharing."1' Since then, a number of solu-
tions, including earnings sharing, have been considered by such entities
as the Advisory Council on Social Security, the President's Commission
on Pension Policy, the National Commission on Social Security, and the
National Commission on Social Security Reform. 112 Yet no constitu-
tional law casebook mentions any aspect of this wide-spread debate
about how to reform the system to correct its structural bias against
women.
Rather than discuss each of the many proposed solutions, I will
briefly describe two possible improvements. 1 3 Neither is ideal. 114
Neither addresses the major difficulty created by linking old-age secur-
ity to life-time wages in a culture in which women receive less in wages
than men. 15 But both are relatively simple and would improve the sit-
uation of many women, especially divorced women. A few lines would
be sufficient, in a casebook note, to refer at least to one of the solutions.
The more radical of the two changes is earnings sharing.' 16 Earn-
ings sharing would eliminate entirely all provisions affording old-age
benefits to dependents and replace them with a new allocation of con-
tributions during marriage. During marriage, half the social security
contribution of each wage- earning spouse would accrue to the account
of the wife and half to the account of the husband. Thus, each partner
would accrue identical social security credits based on half of their joint
earnings. Women's social security accounts, like men's, would then be
fully portable. However long a woman was married, and whatever com-
binations of wage work and domestic work occurred during her life,
everything would count towards her social security account. 1 7 This
111. Id. at 243. The other option was a double-decker plan, creating a bottom level
of benefits higher than current benefit minimums.
112. Id. at 243-45.
113. Readers interested in additional policy readings on these issues should see id.;
Earnings Sharing Implementation Plan: Hearing Before the Task Force on Social Se-
curity and Women of the Subcomm. on Retirement Income and Employment and the
House Select Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); U.S. Dep't of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare, Social Security and the Changing Roles of Men and Women (1979);
Office of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, Social Security Administration, Report on
the Earnings Sharing Implementation Study, 48 Soc. Security Bull. 31 (1985); Note,
Married Couples, supra note 33; A Challenge to Social Security, supra note 74.
114. Both of the "solutions" discussed in the text reinforce (at least marginally) the
two-tier benefit system in the United States, under which "legitimate" beneficiaries re-
ceive rights to "insurance" (such as old-age social security), whereas "illegitimate" ben-
eficiaries receive smaller amounts of means-tested "charity." See, e.g., Nelson, supra
note 85, at 221-23. Many women would be best served by the elimination of the two-
tier system.
115. See supra note 85.
116. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
117. For suggestions on how to improve earnings sharing, see, e.g., A Challenge to
Social Security, supra note 74, at 101; Aaron, Discussion, in A Challenge to Social Secur-
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change would give women credit for both wage labor and their domes-
tic contributions.
This approach is consistent with the economic partnership under-
lying most marriages. Homemakers should receive social security ben-
efits not because they are needy dependents of deserving wage workers,
but because of the division of labor within the household economy in
most marriages."18 In most marriages one spouse, typically the hus-
band, is primarily responsible for the family's economic welfare. The
other spouse in the standard marriage, typically the wife, is primarily
responsible for the domestic front. Although she may also work for
wages outside the home, she likely works fewer hours or at a more flexi-
ble job so as to accommodate her domestic obligations. In return for
the wife's reliance in not pursuing wage labor full-time or full speed
and for her contributions to the household economy, the husband as-
sumes primary responsibility for the family's financial security, includ-
ing their old-age security. Thus, her social security claim is based on
her direct contributions to the household unit and indirect contribu-
tions to the general economy- especially through bearing and rearing
the next generation of workers who will, in fact, be financing the social
security system when their parents retire.1 19
Furthermore-with the important exception of the link between
old-age financial security and wages -earnings sharing eliminates the
problems discussed above. In particular, it equalizes the treatment of
breadwinners and homemakers, and of divorced breadwinners and di-
vorced homemakers, and gives women social security credit for both
wage and domestic work.
Earnings sharing has not, however, been enacted, and the political
barriers to its enactment are not likely to disappear in the near future.
The problem is that the net increase in benefits for women, especially
divorced women, would be offset by reductions in benefits for many
individuals, especially divorced men, but also many wives and wid-
ows.120 For example, under one earnings sharing proposal, in the year
2030, 73% of divorced women entitled to benefits only as covered
workers would receive increased benefits (relative to what they would
receive under current law). And 69% of divorced women entitled to
benefits only as dependents today would also receive increased bene-
ity, at 124. See generally authorities cited supra note 113 (discussing the impact of earn-
ings sharing proposals).
118. See, e.g., G. Becker, A Treatise on the Family 14-32 (1981) (analyzing the
division of labor within households and families).
119. See Becker & Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. & Econ. 1, 8-12
(1988) (suggesting that social security is "part of a 'social compact' between genera-
tions," in which younger generations finance their parents in old age in exchange for the
costly investments made earlier in the children by the parents).
120. There is a no-loser version of income sharing, but it is quite expensive. See
Office of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, supra note 113, at 35.
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fits. 12 1 But 69% of divorced men would receive lower benefits. 12 2 And
many widows-perhaps as many as 44%-would receive lower benefits
than under present law, particularly those who would receive the high-
est level of benefits. 123 With social security, as with any other entitle-
ment program, it is politically difficult, if not impossible, to make
adjustments that decrease existing benefits. And it is in the interests of
most men and many women-women who will (or think they will) stay
in relationships with individual men-to resist major revision of the so-
cial security system such as earnings sharing, despite the long-recog-
nized problems with the current system from the perspective of women,
especially divorced women.
A less politically controversial solution, which would at least elimi-
nate some of the problems facing divorced women, would be to imple-
ment one simple legislative change: a statute providing that in the event
of divorce, state courts can divide social security benefits between the
divorcing couple along with other forms of financial security. 124 Cur-
rently, a Supreme Court case bans such divisions, holding that federal
law governing retirement pensions preempts state law divorce divi-
sions. 125 It should, however, be relatively easy to enact legislation
overruling this decision. Such legislation has already been enacted with
respect to military retirement pay and civil service retirement
annuities.1 26
CONCLUSION
The social security cases approach the social security system as
though there were only one possible problem with the system from the
perspective of sexual equality: that unusual women who are breadwin-
ners for their families might not be treated like male breadwinners. But
the problem with social security-from the perspective of most wo-
men-has never been the inaccuracy of its stereotyped assumptions,
but rather that the system has always afforded a shaky security system to
women in (stereo)typical roles relative to the stronger security system it
affords men in (stereo)typical roles.
121. Id. at 34.
122. Id. at 36.
123. Id. at 34, 36.
124. See Note, Married Couples, supra note 33, at 619.
125. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 587-90 (1979). Hisquierdo in-
volved the railroad retirement system, rather than the social security system. But its
"logic" would apply to social security benefits; it is uniformly regarded as indicating
federal preemption of state-divorce law divisions of social security benefits. See, e.g.,
Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 338-339, 631 P.2d 115, 120-21 (1981); In re Marriage
of Nizenkoff, 65 Cal. App. 3d 138, 139-41, 135 Cal. Rptr. 189, 190-91 (1977); In re
Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 90-93, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259, 263-64 (1976);
Umber v. Umber, 591 P.2d 299, 302 (Okla. 1979); In re Marriage of Swan, 301 Or. 167,
173-74, 720 P.2d 747, 750 (1986).
126. See Note, Married Couples, supra note 33, at 607-08, 619.
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In light of this systemic problem, casebooks on constitutional law
should be changed. Authors of such books should either replace the
social security cases with more important sex-discrimination cases or
should present the cases together with information about the structural
inequities present in the social security system and the possibility of
eliminating these structural inequities. Teachers who assign these
cases should use them to illustrate the pervasiveness of sexual inequal-
ity under formal equality.
Current constitutional law casebooks-such as Stone, Seidman,
Sunstein and Tushnet's-actually obscure the fact that the sexes have
competing interests and must struggle if a more equitable distribution
of resources, including financial security in old age, is to be achieved.
The accepted approach to presenting the law of sex discrimination in a
constitutional law casebook-focusing almost exclusively on the
Court's definition of discrimination-conflates actual discrimination
with legally proscribed discrimination. This obscures the inadequacy of
current remedies and leads to the unquestioning acceptance of a con-
servative legal standard. In addition, students leave law school una-
ware of the need for change where the constitutional standard is
inadequate. For example, it may be that the Court will, for decades to
come, be unwilling to hold that the social security system unconstitu-
tionally discriminates on the basis of sex. Students should, neverthe-
less, leave a class that addresses sex discrimination in the social security
system with some appreciation of the real problems and the need for
legislative change, rather than with the misguided impression that all
significant discrimination against women has been eliminated from the
system. Constitutional law cannot remedy all discrimination. But con-
stitutional law casebooks should not obscure inequality between the
sexes.
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